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Abstract 
In the thirty years since the introduction of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, tremendous 
changes have taken place in the US private pension environment. Traditional defined benefit pension 
plans have been replaced with newer defined contribution-type arrangements. As the change matures, it 
is becoming clear that the problem of optimal pension scheme design has not been solved. On the 
contrary, much work remains to ensure that occupational pension schemes meet the needs of both 
employers and employees. Traditionally, it has been difficult to evaluate different pension scheme designs 
from an economic point of view. This is because there was no theory which modeled how firms and 
workers actually valued their pensions: realistic pension contracts were too complex for traditional 
theoretical economic models. The massive reduction in the cost of computing power has changed this, 
so it is now possible to assess alternative pension designs using a coherent theoretical framework. This 
chapter develops such a framework and presents some illustrative results. 
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Chapter 6
The Future of Pension Plan Design
David McCarthy
Three decades ago, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) (1974) was passed, initiating a wave of change in US private
pension provision. Since that time, many traditional private-sector defined
benefit (DB) pension plans were replaced or augmented with newer de-
fined contribution (DC) arrangements, including 401(k) plans. As the
system matures, it is becoming increasingly clear that the problem of
optimal pension scheme design has not yet been solved. The task ahead
is to ensure that pension systems of the future are adapted to meet workers’
retirement needs as well as employers’ objectives, a task that will require
substantial effort and focus.
In the past, it has been difficult to evaluate alternative pension scheme
designs from an economic point of view. This is because there was no
simple theory which clearly illustrated how firms and workers actually
value their pensions: that is, real-world pension contracts were far more
complex than those that could be modelled with economic tools. In recent
years, however, the reduced cost of computing power has changed how
analysts approach the problem. It is now possible to use numerical analysis
to assess different pension plan designs using a coherent economic frame-
work which is realistic enough to assist researchers and practitioners who
study and design pension plans. In this chapter we develop a framework to
design pension schemes and use it to present some illustrative results.
A key part of this framework is a model of employee preferences. A
realistic model of preferences must include preferences for consumption
and saving, the economic environment in which workers make their de-
cisions (for instance, by including Social Security), the major risks to which
individuals are exposed, and some assessment of changes in attitudes
and exposures to risk1 as people age. In this chapter, we argue that
economic life cycle models are well suited for this purpose. Previous work
has applied them successfully to examine saving and consumption patterns
(Carroll 1997), lifetime investment allocation (Heaton and Lucas 2003),
mortgage choice (Campbell and Cocco 2003), housing purchases (Cerny
et al. 2004), and the impact of state pensions (Campbell et al. 2000), and of
occupational pensions (McCarthy 2003). Here we show how life cycle
models can be applied fruitfully to the issue of pension design, and,
further, how these models can be used to help design pension schemes
which fulfil the objectives of both workers and firms.
In what follows we first identify factors that must be taken into account
when designing pension schemes. Next we briefly discuss life cycle models
of employee preferences and then present a specific model of this type.
After sketching some results, we offer conclusions and draw implications.
Elements of Pension Plan Design
Economists recognize that pension plans are an element of employee
compensation. This means that the efficiency of pension plan design can
only be analyzed as a component of the efficiency of overall employee
compensation. Several aspects of compensation contracts are key in this
discussion, namely taxation, labor markets, employee preferences, and
firm attitudes to risk. We also must acknowledge that the government is a
third party to compensation contracts. That is, firms and workers can
structure employment contracts so as to minimize tax revenues transferred
to governments. In many countries, pensions are tax-advantaged over other
forms of compensation such as cash. In the USA, for instance, pension
contributions are not taxed as income in the hands of employees, and
investment income on pension assets is shielded from tax. This gives
employees one reason to favour pension compensation over cash compen-
sation. Of course, tax needs to be paid on pensions when they are eventu-
ally drawn as income; Poterba (2004) examines the value of the pension tax
shield from the point of view of US workers. From firms’ viewpoint, pension
contributions are similar to other forms of compensation such as cash, as
both can be written off as an expense against taxation reducing the firm’s
taxation liabilities. Pensions are therefore a tax-efficient method of com-
pensation from the point of view of employees.
We now turn to the role that pensions play in labor markets. In the
simplest labor market, often called the ‘spot’ labor market, rational em-
ployees sell their labor services to firms each period on an open market. In
this setting, there would be no involuntary unemployment and no internal
labor markets in firms such as ‘regular’ pay scales, service-linked promo-
tion, or retirement. Under this approach, and if employees had free access
to capital markets, their firms would provide pensions in an employment
arrangement only because of the tax advantage: providing for retirement
via a company pension is cheaper than outside the firm. In other words, if
pensions were not tax-favored, firms would not offer them to employees at
all.2
Labor economists have developed several theories to explain why, in fact,
pensions are offered as an element of labor contracts beyond the tax
rationale. One prominent explanation is the deferred-wage theory, which
holds that pensions can be used to induce long employee tenure at the firm.
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This would be valued by firms where tenure is associated with higher worker
productivity—perhaps because skills are specific to the job at hand and can
only be learned on the job. Long tenure also reduces recruitment and direct
training costs. Under this view, pensions are a way to pass some of the
rewards of this extra productivity on to workers. The mechanism is thought
to involve workers posting a ‘bond’ with the firm, by working for lower wages
early in their employment. The deferred compensation is then returned to
them in later years, in the form of a pension (or perhaps also with an upward
sloping wage-tenure profile). Workers will consent to this arrangement if it
pays them compensation which, in expectation, exceeds what they would
earn without a pension (or with a flat wage-tenure profile). This increase
compensates the fact that the worker must remain longer with the firm, and
hence it has been called an ‘option loss’ or ‘indenture premium.’ DB
pensions are thought to be especially useful for such backloaded employ-
ment contracts, since they explicitly defer pay until later in the contract and
because they are harder for firms to renege on thanunsecured promises. DC
pensions with a vesting employer match may have similar effects.3
Another explanation offered by labor economists for pensions is that
these contracts help manage the asymmetric information problem between
the firm and potential workers, when firms are unable to verify the likely
productivity of new hires. An employment contract which pays a pension
defers payment to later in life, so jobs with pensions might be more
attractive to workers who either have low discount rates, or who have
greater expectations of salary increases, that is, those who expect to be
more productive. Low discounters, it is believed, make better workers
because they are willing to invest more in learning. As a result, offering a
pension is likely to attract more productive workers, so this view is known as
the ‘sorting theory’ of pensions.4
A related rationale for offering pensions is that firms which do can influ-
ence employee retirement patterns, an outcome of particular value to firms
that use tilted wage profiles to control turnover (Fields and Mitchell 1982).
This is because with tilted wage profiles, employees will earnmore than their
alternative opportunities before they retire, which is a disincentive to retire.
Consequently, a firm can design its pension to induce workers to retire as
part of the retirement contract. There are also sociological reasonswhy firms
might wish workers to retire, including the transactions costs associated with
forcing older employees with long service to retire if they are unable to fulfil
their job responsibilities. Some types of pension are better at achieving these
different goals than others: for instance, some pensions may have only a
small effect on job turnover or sorting depending on how they are designed.
The literature shows that DB pensions are especially effective at influencing
retirement bymeans of nonactuarially neutral benefit formulas; by contrast,
DC plans tend to be less influential of retirement outcomes, depending on
the workers’ accumulated values as they near retirement.
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All of the labor market explanations of pensions have one factor in
common: they downplay the fact that employees are more risk-averse
than firms, yet they can access the same capital markets as can firms.
Workers are believed to be more risk-averse because investors who own
the firms can diversify their exposure by trading in securities, while em-
ployees are unable to do the same with their wage income.5 Thus a
financial economics approach to pensions would include the fact that
different compensation arrangements can have very different implications
for employees’ portfolio costs in these plans. A further aspect of pensions
to be considered in the financial economics context is the corporate
finance aspect of pensions. That is, different pension strategies impose
different risks on employers, which should be acknowledged in the mod-
eling approach. For instance, DB pensions expose employers to investment
risk and mortality risk. Also firms may have different risk preferences than
their workers: for instance, a small family-owned business might react
differently to risk than a public-sector employer. Some firms may also be
able to hedge risks more easily: for instance, wage fluctuations might be
reasonably well hedged by firm income in larger companies, while mortal-
ity risk would be very difficult for any firm but the government or a large life
insurance company, to hedge effectively.
Another aspect of pension compensation which needs to be considered
is the role that pensions play in workers’ overall portfolios. Pension con-
tracts change workers’ risk exposures, and they also alter the allocation of
compensation over the life cycle. For instance, DB pension arrangements
magnify the risk exposure of an individual to salary risk, and both DC and
DB pension arrangements defer the pay of younger workers to later in their
lives. Younger workers might therefore value cash in hand highly, because
they have immediate cash needs, while older workers might bemore willing
to defer compensation to later in life as they are saving anyway.
Both of these effects are portfolio costs that depend on how effectively
employees can access capital markets on their own. To the extent
that employees and employers can trade freely in capital markets, the
portfolio efficiency of pension compensation is irrelevant, because well-
informed employees will simply adjust their portfolios to achieve any de-
sired risk exposure. By contrast, if employees cannot trade freely on capital
markets—for instance because of portfolio restrictions, liquidity con-
straints, moral hazard or incomplete markets—then the portfolio efficiency
of pensions becomes important. An example might make this clearer. For
instance, imagine that employees were offered movie tickets as part of their
compensation package. Two movie tickets per month might be an effective
way of compensating employees who like to go to the movies. But if employ-
ees were paid a large fraction of their wages in movie tickets, the value they
place on this compensation would decline dramatically because they cannot
cheaply sell large numbers of movie tickets for cash. By choosing to pay
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employees inmovie tickets, the firm imposes on workers a portfolio cost. We
might therefore call this form of compensation portfolio inefficient, in this
case entirely because of the transactions costs involved in regularly selling
large quantities of movie tickets.
In some respects, paying individuals pensions is akin to paying them
movie tickets: pensions cannot be traded or borrowed against, and they
impose liquidity constraints on workers. Pensions also increase worker
exposure to risks which cannot be traded, such as wage risks. Unlike
movie tickets, of course, pensions produce income in retirement and may
also protect workers from some risks.
A general framework for deciding optimal pension design should take
account of all four of these aspects: tax efficiency, incentive compatibility,
portfolio efficiency, and corporate finance. Yet only a partial list has been
considered in previous studies. For instance, Ippolito (1994) assessed
compensation strategies which account for some labor incentive aspects,
but he ignores worker portfolios. Bodie et al. (1988) examine pensions
from the point of view of portfolio efficiency, but they ignore labor market
aspects, taxation, and corporate finance issues. McCarthy (2003) has a
more complete model of portfolio efficiency and mentions firm risk, but
he assumes that firms can hedge all their pension risks away.
A Model of Pension System Design
We have argued that a comprehensive framework for a theoretically opti-
mal pension compensation strategy would recognize the key role of the
following elements:
1. A firm which chooses a compensation strategy (i.e. designs a pension
plan) based on some criterion, for instance, maximizing expected
profits. Risk-averse smaller firms might take some of the risk they are
exposed to by pension arrangements into account, too, in determin-
ing the optimal pension.
2. Workers who respond to the incentives provided by compensation
strategies. Pension design affects firm profits via the direct cost of
the compensation, and also via the effect that compensation has on
worker recruitment and behaviour. This would include labor market
aspects such as sorting, tenure and retirement.
3. An incentive compatibility constraint to ensure that the pension does not
cause worker and firm incentives to be misaligned; and
4. A worker participation constraint, which ensures that the firm is able to
recruit the quality and quantity of workers it needs to produce its
output. To take into account worker preferences, this would need to
be expressed not in terms of the wages that the worker is offered, but
in terms of the lifetime utility that the worker expects to achieve. This
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measure takes into account the portfolio efficiency of the pension
scheme within the context of the worker’s entire portfolio. This port-
folio includes worker’s future wages, the major risks to which the
workers are exposed (investment risks, mortality risk, income risk),
the preferences of the worker, any portfolio restrictions on the worker,
and how all of these factors change over working life and retirement.
These ideas may be illustrated using a simple three-period model of em-
ployment and pensions, building on Ippolito (1994) who examined inden-
ture premia, and Bodie et al. (1988) who assessed the portfolio effects of
different pension arrangements. Here we posit two work periods and one
retirement period. Employers may pay remuneration during the retire-
ment period which is the pension. Workers have access to capital markets
but they can only save, not borrow against future wages. There is only one
asset and it is not risky. Workers have no assets except what they have saved
and their future wages, called here their human capital. Workers must save
to smooth out consumption over their lifetimes. In this simple formulation,
there is no Social Security system and compensation including only wages
and (possibly) pensions. We further abstract from taxes and uncertain
mortality. For simplicity, the interest rate on the risk free asset and workers’
discount rates are assumed to equal zero. The model also assumes that per
period hours of work are fixed and that the firm faces an infinite demand
for goods at the current price.
The firm can choose a wage profile w 1 and ~w 2, and a pension ~p. At the
beginning of period 1, the employee knowsw 1 but not ~w 2 or ~p. The values of
these are revealed at the beginning of period 2 and may be random.
However, the worker knows the statistical distribution of likely second-
period wages and pension payments. Then, given a compensation structure,
the employee chooses his consumption in periods 1 and 2 to maximize:
U (w 1, w 2, p) ¼ max
c 1,c 2
u(c 1)þ E[u(c 2)þ u(c 3)]
s:t: 0 < c 1#w 1, 0 < c 2#w 1  c 1 þ ~w 2 and 0 < c 3
¼ w 1  c 1 þ ~w 2  c 2 þ~p:
The constraints come from the fact that the employee is assumed to start
off with no assets and cannot borrow against future income. In the final
period, the worker consumes all his assets. This is a particularly simple
model of preferences: in principle, it could be made as complex as desired.
Let the pension ~p be a final salary DB pension with accrual rate a.
Contributions to the pension are deducted from cash wages, and because
the interest rate is zero, expected contributions must sum to the expected
pension. If we assume that E[w2] ¼ w 1 and that p ¼ 2aw 2, for a $ 0, and
that the employer is risk-neutral, then the employer’s optimization prob-
lem is:
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(w 1, w 2, a) ¼ arg max
w 1, w 2, a
R(w 1, w 2, a) w 1  w 2E[~Z þ 2a~Z]
s:t: U (w 1, w 2, a)$U and a, w 1, w 2$ 0
Here the term R(w 1, w 2, a) represents the revenue the firm earns from
selling its products, net of training and recruitment costs. If the compen-
sation structure makes workers work harder, then net revenue will be
higher, which is why revenue is a function of the compensation structure.
The participation constraint U (w 1, w 2, a )$U shows that employers de-
sign a compensation contract which attracts workers. In this model there is
no incentive compatability constraint: this could be introduced by stipulat-
ing that in all periods, workers may not sell future labor for current wages.
The implications of this simple model are interesting. First, firms have an
incentive to pay workers in ways which are beneficial for the worker. It is not
necessary for firms to ‘care’ about workers for this to be so: by paying
employees in a form the employees value, employers reduce their total
compensation bills and potentially increase profits. Alternatively, by paying
workers in a form they do not value, firms increase their total compensa-
tion bill and therefore earn fewer profits. A familiar example of this
phenomenon involves taxation. Arguably, in the USA, firms are fairly
indifferent between 401(k) pension and cash compensation from a tax
point of view: both can be written off against income to reduce the firm’s
tax liability.6 However, because workers face a lower tax bill on pension
compensation, firms can give workers a higher post-tax wage by paying part
of the wage as a pension. A less familiar example might be the form of the
benefit itself: if workers are paid a risky pension which they cannot hedge,
as in the above example, firms must boost wages to compensate employees
for taking on this risk.
If we introduce into the above analysis risks that workers and firms can
hedge by trading on capital markets, some perhaps surprising results
obtain. For instance, firms derive no value from protecting workers from
risks that workers can hedge, such as investment risk, and they will get no
benefit from exposing workers to these risks. The reason for this is that
workers could choose to buy this protection on the markets themselves,
and they would pay the same price as the firm. In this setting, employees
are indifferent between receiving protection from traded risks as part of
their compensation (which they could then sell for cash if they wished), or
receiving cash and buying the protection themselves. Of course, in the real
world, workers cannot trade freely on capital markets for many reasons,
one of which is the cost of learning how to manage assets. Yet this model
suggests that the cost of prescribing an investment strategy for workers in
their pension plans is relatively low, if workers are able to trade competently
themselves. If workers are unable to trade competently, the benefits of
prescribing an investment strategy may be quite high.
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Two other implications of this analysis need to be mentioned. The first is
the issue of underfunded DB pension plans. If promising workers a stake in
an underfunded pension plan has no effect on effort, then this is an
expensive way to pay workers. This is because workers already have substan-
tial undiversifiable exposure to the firm: if the firm goes bankrupt, they
stand to lose their jobs. Giving workers a claim on an underfunded pension
is paying them partly with long-term credit notes on the company, which
boosts their exposure to the firm’s credit risk. If the firm is a publicly traded
corporation, workers could hedge this risk by selling the company stock
short, or by buying credit default swaps on the firm’s debt instruments
(assuming these can be purchased). Of course there may be incentive
problems caused by the workers effectively holding a short position in the
company stock, and workers will suffer transactions costs and will need to
be reimbursed for these in the form of higher total compensation. The
firm could thus reduce compensation costs by paying workers with a fully
funded pension. If the firm is not publicly traded, then workers have no way
of diversifying this risk away and will have to be compensated for the credit
risk of the firm in the form of higher total wages. Paying workers in the
form of insecure, underfunded pensions is therefore an expensive way to
compensate them.
A second issue is compensating workers with 401(k) plans that contain
restricted company stock. Exactly the same theoretical analysis as per-
formed above applies: in the absence of incentive effects, this is an expen-
sive way for firms to remunerate employees because they are already heavily
exposed to company risk. Watson Wyatt (2004) reports the results of a US
survey showing that workers routinely value options and restricted stock at
a discount to their true cost. It is interesting that some employers say they
pay employees in this form because they believe that it will help to align
the incentives of workers and owners, partly to induce workers to
sort themselves, and partly to retain workers.7
More Realistic Pension Designs
Next we turn to a life cycle model which extends the framework above, by
using a computational approach that permits an evaluation of how workers
might value pensions of different types, and how one might develop
optimal pension compensation strategies for employers, under a range of
economic and demographic assumptions. We build on McCarthy’s (2003)
life cycle model to characterize the major risks to which workers are
exposed (investment risks, wage risks, and mortality risk), and how the
workers exposure to these, changes as they age, retire, and finally die. In
this approach, the worker is assumed to maximize utility and work until age
65 when he retires; death happens with certainty before age 100 but he
might also die before retirement. (In practice, we use mortality patterns of
6 / Future of Pension Plan Design 99
US females born in 1980.) Each period he works, he receives a risky wage
which may be consumed or invested in stocks or bonds, with the
asset allocation redetermined each year. The bond pays a constant real
rate of return, while stocks pay a risky rate of return. The worker cannot
borrow against future wages or stock holdings, and he cannot sell stocks
short in order to buy bonds. To keep the analysis tractable, we abstract from
a Social Security system and housing assets in this model. The structure of
the model is outlined in Table 6-1.
To represent real-world earnings data, we assume that wages are subject
to transitory and persistent shocks. The transitory shocks affect only cur-
rent earnings and have no effect on future pay (e.g. a sales agent might
have a bad week because she had a cold), while persistent shocks are
Table 6-1 Structure of the Life Cycle Model
Working period Retirement period
Time 1 2 . . . T t þ 1 . . . t þ s
Income W1 W2 . . . Wt 0 . . . 0
Wealth A1 A2 . . . At Atþ1 . . . Atþs
Pension P1 P2 . . . Pt Ptþ1 . . . Ptþs
Consumption C1 C2 . . . Ct Ctþ1 . . . Ctþs
Risky asset return R2 . . . Rt Rtþ1 . . . Rtþs
Notes : At each time period the individual chooses how much to consume and how much to
save from current income. The asset mix of savings (between bonds and equities) can be
adjusted each period. Income is stochastic with permanent and temporary errors. Risky
asset returns are assumed to be log normally distributed with a constantmean and variance.
Retirement is assumed to be at age 65. The individual is assumed to face mortality while
working and retired. The maximum possible length of the retirement period is 35 years. At
time 0, the individual is offered a pension contract, whichmay be a defined benefit (DB) or
a defined contribution (DC) pension. At retirement, the individual can choose to purchase
an annuity from private savings on the private market. To model the costs of adverse
selection, the annuity is not priced fairly but has amultiplicative loading factor incorporated
into the price. This annuity pays a level annual pension for life. The individual can purchase
an annuity regardless of the pension plan arrangement. Annuities that are mandatory do
not attract an adverse selection charge; voluntarily-purchased annuities attract a charge for
adverse selection. There is no bequest motive, labor supply is assumed to be exogenous and
the individual is not permitted to borrow either stocks or bonds. The individual maximizes:
max
{Y , Ci , ai }
E0
Xt þ s
i¼ 1
bipiu(Ci)
where
u(C) ¼ C
1g
1 g , g$ 1,
and pi is the assumed probability the individual is alive at time i conditional on being alive at
time 0. The individual is offered one of several pension arrangements as described in the text.
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assumed to influence future wages (e.g. a professional skier might have a
serious accident). Such shocks cause wages to fluctuate around age and
education-dependent wage profiles derived from US data (see the notes to
Table 6-1). Workers with different educational backgrounds are permitted
to have different mean earnings as well as different earnings shocks. The
data also show that more educated workers tend to have more permanent
wage shocks, a fact with important implications for pension design.
Just after retirement, at age 65, we assume that the retiree can buy an
annuity in the private annuity market at an actuarially unfair price—which
means that the expected present value of the lifetime benefit is below the
annuity premium. The price is set to be unfair to reflect the possibility of
adverse selection in the annuity market. During the retirement period, the
retiree then receives income equal to any pension plan income, plus his
private annuity income. The individual is assumed to choose his consump-
tion, investment strategy, and annuitization to maximize his expected dis-
counted lifetime utility. Using numerical techniques discussed in McCarthy
(2003), we calculate the total expected discounted lifetime utility workers of
different ages and types. By calibrating theparameters of themodel to actual
US data, we can use the model to approximate preference structure of US
workers.This allowsus toexaminehowtheseworkersmight valuepensionsof
different types.
To implement the model, we must further specify tastes for consumption
in each period, theworker’s degree of risk aversion (which affects howmuch
he would willingly pay for insurance against risk), and his personal discount
factor (the higher the discount factor, the more valuable is consumption
today versus tomorrow). We denote the expected discounted lifetime utility
of theworkerwithnopensionbenefit asU0(1); the lifetimeutility of aworker
with no pension benefit but having an initial endowment and lifetime in-
come is higher by a factor of m, so his utility may be written U0(m). To
introducedifferentpensionarrangements into themodel,we let the lifetime
utility of a worker with a pension of type i be denoted by Ui(1). More details
appear in Table 6-2.
The specific pension arrangements to be examined here include the
following:8
1. A noncontributory DB pension with varying replacement rates. This pension
pays a benefit from retirement (age 65) until the individual dies,
with the benefit set to equal a fraction a of the individual’s final
salary (hence a is the pension replacement rate). We define the
worker’s expected discounted lifetime utility with this pension benefit
as U1(1), and the expected discounted cost of this benefit to the
employer is C1.
2. A DC pension with contributions over and above cash wages of 10 percent of
pay; here there is no investment choice and no mandatory annuitization.
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Under this plan, contributions accumulate in a separate account
which the worker will not be permitted to access before retirement.
At retirement, the DC assets are added to the retiree’s other assets and
these may be used in whole or in part to buy a private annuity, or they
could be consumed freely. We denote the expected discounted life-
time utility of the worker with this pension benefit as U2(1), and the
employer’s expected discounted cost of this benefit as C 2.
3. A DC pension with contributions over and above cash wages of 10 percent of
pay; here there is no investment choice but annuitization is mandatory. In this
case, the contributions accumulate in a separate account as before,
but after retirement the worker receives a lifelong annual pension
payment equal to the accumulated DC balance at retirement, divided
by the price of a fair annuity. We denote the expected discounted
Table 6-2 Model Parameterization
Assumptiona
Risk aversion 5
Time preference 4%
Risk-free interest rate 2%
Equity risk premium 4%
Equity uncertainty sh ¼ 0:157
Permanent income Polynomial profileb
profile
Income uncertainty u ¼ 1 u ¼ 1 u ¼ 1
sj ¼ 0:130 sj ¼ 0:136 sj ¼ 0:162
s« ¼ 0:121c s« ¼ 0:103c s« ¼ 0:102c
(College) (High School) (No High School)
Mortality US Femalesd
Equity/permanent wage
error correlation
rhj ¼ 0:15 rhj ¼ 0:10 rhj ¼ 0:10
Liquidity constraints Imposed
Private annuity market l ¼ 10%e
Notes
a No bequest motive is assumed and labor supply is assumed exogenous.
bThis profile, from Campbell et al. (2000), was estimated from the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics (PSIS) separately for college-educated individuals.
cThese estimates are from Campbell et al. (1999) PSID analysis; his temporary standard
deviations for college-educated individuals were halved to allow for measurement error.
These values are slightly higher than those found in Hubbard et al. (1995), Heaton and
Lucas (2000), and Carroll (1996).
d We use projected mortality for the 1980 cohort of US females calculated by the Berkeley
mortality database with data from the Social Security Administration; see demog.berkeley.edu/
wilmoth/mortality
e Mitchell et al. (1999) estimate adverse selection and loading costs to be around 10
percent of the cost of annuities.
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lifetime utility of the worker with this pension benefit U3(1), and the
employer’s expected discounted cost of this benefit as C3.
To calculate the value of the different pension arrangements to the indi-
vidual we solve for mi in the following equation: U0(mi) ¼ Ui(1). In eco-
nomic terms, mi is the ‘compensating variation’ if pension arrangements
change. It is the factor by which a worker’s initial endowment and lifetime
income would have to be changed, in order to exactly compensate him for
the change in that pension. If mi is high, we can conclude that this
particular pension is more highly valued than when mi is low. We solve
this equation by noting that, from the preference function assumed, a
change in m is nothing more than a change of currency or numeraire,
and therefore that:9
mi ¼ Ui(1)
U0(1)
  1
1g
:
It should be noted here that this specification only focuses on employee
preferences: there is no explicit employer in this model so it includes only
part of the more complete framework discussed previously.
Results
To make the different pension arrangements comparable, the results in
Table 6-3 constrain the costs of each pension offer to the same proportion
of workers’ lifetime cash wages (this version of the model abstracts from
taxes). These results have implications of offering an employee different
pension schemes, each of which has the same cost. The cost for each DC
arrangement is therefore set at 10 percent of lifetime income from the
point that the worker joins the plan onward. The DB plan generosity is
adjusted at each age to ensure that its cost is equal to that of the DC
arrangement. For instance, for a worker with no high school education
who joined the DB plan at age 30, a contribution of 10 percent of cash
wages until retirement was sufficient to purchase a DB pension with a
replacement rate of 40 percent; by contrast, for a worker with no high
school education joining the plan at age 50, this contribution would only
be sufficient to purchase a pension with a replacement rate of 12 percent.
The generosity of the DB pension declines in a nonlinear way with the age
at joining, because of the effect of earnings, mortality, and interest rates
over the life cycle. Workers with different educational backgrounds who
pay contributions worth 10 percent of wages into a DB pension plan will
end up with pensions of slightly different generosity, because of different
expected wage profiles.
A key variable of interest in the pension design arena is the difference
between the cost of the pension, paid by the firm in this model, and the
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cash-equivalent value of the pension, which is the compensating variation
to the worker. If a worker felt that the cash equivalent of a pension was
worth less than the cost of the pension to the firm, then that pension would
be an inefficient way to pay people (or the difference would have to be due
to some other aspect not in the model, such as tax efficiencies or labor
market effects of the pension on sorting and turnover). Table 6-3 shows the
difference between the cost of the pension (assumed at 10 percent of cash
wages for all pension types), and the compensating variation of the pen-
sion; the gap is then expressed as a percentage of the cost of the pension.10
One striking result in Table 6-3 is that all the values are positive: that is,
the compensating variation of pensions is always less than the cost of the
pension. This is because, in the absence of tax effects, workers are always
better off with cash than with pensions because of the undiversifiable risks
to which pensions expose them, and because of the forced savings aspects
and illiquidity of pensions. Consider a worker age 30: in the DB plan, the
figures in parentheses show the pension replacement rates that could be
purchased by contributions worth 10 percent of cash wages. For a college-
educated 30 year old, 10 percent of lifetime cash wages will purchase a DB
pension with a replacement rate of 38 percent. But the table shows that this
worker would receive equal lifetime utility from a boost in cash compensa-
tion worth 39 percent less than the pension plan’s cost. In other words,
unless the labor market and taxation effects of paying a DB pension are
worth 39 percent of the pension cost, it is an expensive proposition to pay
the worker such a DB pension. Workers of the same age but with less
education value a DB plan only slightly more: the welfare loss is 27 percent
of the cost of the pension for those with a high school education, and 26
percent for those with no high school education.
It is of interest that, under Model 2, the loss from a DC plan is lower than
for a DB plan for some individuals but not others, such that college-
educated individuals have a lower loss (15 percent for a plan invested all
in equities) than the less educated (22 percent for the same portfolio). It is
also worth noting that the value of a DB plan is relatively higher for low-
educated workers than for highly educated, particularly for those entering
the firm at older ages. We also find that mandatory annuitization under the
DC plan reduces the welfare loss of DC pension arrangements by roughly 7
percent, comparing Model 2 with the voluntary annuitization results for
Model 3. This result may overstate the appeal of annuitization to the extent
that other alternatives are available (cf. Yaari 1965).
The impact of mandatory investment policy in the DC plan on welfare
losses is much smaller than some may have anticipated: for instance, the
welfare loss grows by only about 10 percent of the pension cost, when
the investment strategy changes from 30 percent to 100 percent equities.
The reason is that the investment strategy is only important while workers
are liquidity-constrained. Once they have amassed sufficient assets outside
6 / Future of Pension Plan Design 105
the pension plan, they can alter the investment mix of those other assets to
achieve any desired overall asset allocation.
We now examine the results for a worker aged 40, with 25 years until
retirement. Here the DB pension plan imparts a lower welfare loss than
before, because wage uncertainty for older workers is lower due to the fact
that fewer years remain until retirement. In addition, because they are
nearer to retirement, the liquidity constraint associated with forced saving
in pensions is not as binding because these workers are starting to antici-
pate retirement and increase their savings. The DB plan is still less favor-
able for college-educated workers than for other types of workers, for the
reasons discussed. For DC pensions, the welfare loss is smaller for older
workers because the natural propensity to save of workers increases with
age. Therefore the forced savings aspect of DC pensions is smaller, and the
illiquidity of the DC pension wealth is less of a factor. In addition, the DC
investment strategy has a much smaller effect on wellbeing, because of the
fact that with higher savings, the range of achievable overall investment
strategies is greater despite the pension investment restrictions. Differ-
ences between subjective valuations of the DC pension by different classes
of worker are surprisingly large. This may be due to the different age-wage
profiles of the different classes of worker or the different pattern for wage
shock variance and persistence.
By age 50, the welfare loss associated with the DB plan is less than that
associated with the DC plan, for low-educated workers. This is due to the
effect of declining human capital and increasing financial capital on the
valuation of DB pension plans, as discussed above. The welfare loss of DC
pension falls due to the fact that most workers at age 50 are saving for their
retirement which looms near, at age 65. There is now almost no difference
between the welfare losses of DC pensions with very different investment
strategies, as most individuals are saving enough to ensure that they are
able to achieve their optimal desired overall asset allocation. Once again,
there are surprisingly large differences between workers of different types.
Implications and Conclusions
Though many forms of pensions have been tried in the marketplace to
date, it is fair to say that the pension environment is in flux around the
world. Much work remains to design pension systems that best meet em-
ployee needs as well as employer objectives. This chapter draws together
the literature on pension compensation and optimal portfolio choice to
seek solutions to the ‘pension design’ problem.
Inasmuch as pension schemes are an element of employee compensa-
tion, we propose that pension design must be evaluated in terms of how
well any given plan format fits into the objectives set for employee com-
pensation more generally. Our financial economics approach to pension
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design recognizes the fact that compensation arrangements can have very
distinct impacts on employees covered by these plans. In particular, pen-
sion contracts alter workers’ risk exposures and the allocation of compen-
sation over the life cycle. As a result, having a pension, changes the value
that an employee would ascribe to different pension and compensation
arrangements.
Our results suggest that DB pension arrangements magnify the risk
exposure of an individual to salary risk, and both DC and DB pension
arrangement defer the pay of younger workers to later in their lives.
Younger workers therefore value cash more highly, and DC plans in par-
ticular, because they have immediate cash needs. In contrast, DB pensions
may be a cost-effective method of compensation for older, less well-
educated employees. We also conclude that promising workers a stake in
an underfunded pension plan is an expensive way to pay employees,
particularly if the underfunding has no positive impact on effort. Of
course, giving workers 401(k) plans holding restricted company stock is
also an expensive way to remunerate employees, because they are already
heavily exposed to company risk.
Our results also imply that a hybrid scheme might be designed to better
suit both types of employees. Such a plan would have workers beginning
their careers with a DC pension heavily invested in bonds, and then later
they would switch to a fully-funded DB scheme; this would likely be a cost-
effective way of remunerating employees. Several factors which have not yet
been incorporated in our model strengthen this conclusion. The first has
to do with job turnover, which makes DB plans riskier for younger employ-
ees because of the fact that most vested DB pensions in the US are not
indexed to inflation after workers terminate. This exposes individuals to
inflation risk in their DB pensions and imposes a pension capital loss on
these workers. Awareness of such risk would further reduce the attractive-
ness of DB plans for younger employees.10 Also if employees find it is costly
to make pension investment decisions, having the employer select a DC
investment strategy would benefit the employees while imposing few costs
on those workers able to adjust their own portfolios to compensate for the
imposed pension investment mix. An alternative design might be a form of
fully matched cash balance plan for younger workers, which changes to an
explicit salary link for older workers.
We must note that our model here does not include taxes, which pre-
vents us from inferring the overall level of pension generosity relative to
cash wages. Poterba (2004) computes the value of the current tax shield
accorded to US retirement accounts, and he finds that in the case of fixed-
income assets, the tax shield is not very large unless very long time horizons
are used (and even then only for workers with high marginal tax rates and
high interest rates). For equity investments, the tax protection of pensions
is significantly lower in all cases. While the tax effects might have been
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larger in the past, currently the tax effects appear small, implying that the
labor market effects of pensions—and especially DB pensions—would have
to be substantial, to justify their use as a compensation tool for younger
workers.
Future work will extend our analysis of optimal pension design. We
anticipate including worker preferences more explicitly within this frame-
work to derive optimal pension compensation strategies for workers of
different types, who are engaged at firms having varying attitudes toward
risk. A further area needing more work in the financial economics context
is the corporate finance aspect of pensions. That is, different pension
strategies impose different risks on employers, which should be acknow-
ledged in the modeling approach. We also expect to evaluate the sensitivity
of results to assumptions regarding worker responses to pension incentives,
and we hope to test model predictions using firm-level pension data.
Endnotes
1. This is a simple model of the labor market which ignores issues such as transac-
tions costs, skills specificity, on-the-job training, customs, indenture premia,
differences in risk aversion between firms and employees, asymmetric informa-
tion and incentives, all of which may have implications for pensions. Bulow
(1982) presents an early discussion of labor markets and pensions from a
financial point of view.
2. Lazear (1979) discussion of wage-tilt and tenure, and Ippolito (1997) covers the
compensation aspects of DC pensions.
3. Allen et al. (1993) and Ippolito (1997) discuss pensions and sorting.
4. Of course, some firms may be more risk averse than others: for instance, the
attitude to risk of a small family-owned business is likely to be very different to
that of a publicly traded multinational company.
5. This abstracts from the fact that 401(k) contributions are subject to social
security payroll tax.
6. See Oyer and Schaefer (2004) for an empirical investigation of why employers
pay employees with stock options.
7. Euler equations are derived in McCarthy (2003).
8. The model was checked by solving the same equation numerically, and the
results were found to agree with the analytical results to the degree of precision
reported in the tables.
9. It should be noted that further assumptions are required to interpret the results
as speaking to the efficiency of different pension formats. If pensions have no
labor market effects, and the firm is risk neutral or can hedge all pension-related
risks (such as wage changes and mortality changes) perfectly, then the results
may be interpreted as informative about the efficiency of pension compensation
from the firm’s point of view. The results can also be used to assess how large the
labor market effects of pensions need to be, to make them an efficient compen-
sation strategy.
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10. Of course, if the presence of a DB pension plan had significant effects on the
turnover of younger employees, this higher cost might be offset by lower
recruitment and training costs.
References
Allen, Steven G., Robert L. Clark, and Ann A. McDermed (1993). ‘Pensions, Bond-
ing, and Lifetime Jobs’, Journal of Human Resources, 28: 463–81.
Bodie, Zvi, Alan J. Marcus, and Robert C. Merton (1988). ‘Defined Benefit versus
Defined Contribution Pension Plans: What are the Real Tradeoffs?’, in Z. Bodie,
J. Shoven and D. Wise (eds.), Pensions in the US Economy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Bulow, Jeremy I. (1982). ‘What Are Corporate Pension Liabilities?’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 97(3): 435–52.
Campbell, John Y. and Joao Cocco (2003). ‘Household Risk Management and
Optimal Mortgage Choice’, Working Paper, London Business School.
—— —— Francisco J. Gomes and Pascal J. Maenhout (2000). ‘Investing Retire-
ment Wealth: A Life Cycle Model’, in Martin Feldstein and John Y. Campbell,
(eds.), Risk Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform. NBER, Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Carroll, Christopher (1996). ‘Buffer Stock Saving and the Life Cycle/Permanent
Income Hypothesis’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII(1): 1–56.
Cerny, Ales, David K. Miles, and Lubomir Schmidt (2004). ‘A Calibrated Model of
Saving, Portfolio Allocation and Housing Choices’, Working Paper, Imperial
College.
Fields, Gary and Olivia S. Mitchell (1982). Retirement, Pensions and Social Security.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Heaton, John and Deborah Lucas (2000). ‘Portfolio Choice in the Presence of
Background Risk’, The Economic Journal, 110 (January): 1–26.
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes (1995). ‘Precaution-
ary Saving and Social Insurance’, Journal of Political Economy, 103(2): 360–99.
Ippolito, Richard A. (1994). ‘Pensions and Indenture Premia’, Journal of Human
Resources, 29(3): 795–812.
—— (1997). Pension Plans and Employee Performance: Evidence, Analysis, and Policy.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lazear, Edward P. (1979). ‘Why Is ThereMandatory Retirement?’, Journal of Political
Economy 87: 1261–84.
McCarthy, David G. (2003). ‘A Life-cycle Analysis of Defined Benefit Pension Plans’,
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 2(2): 99–126.
Mitchell, Olivia S., James M. Poterba, Jeffrey R. Brown, and Mark Warshawsky
(MPBW) (1999). ‘New Evidence on the Money’s Worth of Individual Annuities’,
American Economic Review, 89: 1299–1318.
Oyer, Paul and Scott Schaefer (2004). ‘Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to
All Employees? An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories’, NBER Work-
ing Paper, 10222.
Poterba, James M (2004). ‘Valuing Assets in Retirement Savings Accounts’, Boston
College Working Paper, 2004–11.
6 / Future of Pension Plan Design 109
Watson Wyatt (2004). ‘Employees Undervalue Stock Option Grants’, News Report,
<www.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID¼13001>
Yaari, Menahem. (1965). ‘Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance and the Theory of the
Consumer’, Review of Economic Studies, 32: 137–50.
110 David McCarthy
